When there is freedom in choosing where to live among jurisdictions competing for residents, individuals will "shop" for jurisdictions that most closely match their demands for local public goods and this process is efficiency-enhancing. Tiebout (1956) first made this argument to challenge the Musgrave-Samuelson analysis, in which the market falls short of providing the efficient amount of public goods due to the free rider problem resultant from individuals' failure to truthfully report their preferences. In the ideal world envisioned by Tiebout, individuals sort themselves into groups with similar preferences by freely moving to their desired community, and thus reveal their true preferences for public goods in the process.
Introduction
When there is freedom in choosing where to live among jurisdictions competing for residents, individuals will "shop" for jurisdictions that most closely match their demands for local public goods and this process is efficiency-enhancing. Tiebout (1956) first made this argument to challenge the Musgrave-Samuelson analysis, in which the market falls short of providing the efficient amount of public goods due to the free rider problem resultant from individuals' failure to truthfully report their preferences. In the ideal world envisioned by Tiebout, individuals sort themselves into groups with similar preferences by freely moving to their desired community, and thus reveal their true preferences for public goods in the process.
The Tiebout hypothesis has spurred a fruitful research agenda in public finance and urban economics, and the efficiency-enhancing property of the Tiebout solution has been corroborated and supported by both theoretical and empirical work.
With the level of public goods provisions and taxes preset by the jurisdictions in the Tiebout model, individuals vote by moving to the jurisdiction that closely approximates their demands for local services rather than by ballots on the community's budget. Voting mechanisms, which play a crucial role in the literature on public finance and public choice, therefore, are absent in the original Tiebout model. Some extensions of the Tiebout model, however, have integrated ballot voting. Konishi (1995) , for instance, obtains efficient equilibrium outcomes in a local public good economy where individuals have free mobility and each jurisdiction is allowed to adopt certain collective choice rules to determine public goods provision and taxation. In other words, efficient outcomes can be achieved when individuals vote both by feet and by ballots.
The efficiency-enhancing property of this version of the Tiebout model, where individuals can vote both by feet and by ballots, is illustrated in the classroom experiment presented here. We find that individual students choose the level of public goods provision and taxation that most resembles their preferences by moving to a community with other like-minded residents and by voting to pass a budget the community as a whole prefers. Further, the exercise shows that the moves made by individual students are almost always Pareto improving and the total net benefit from all communities increases when residents are free to move and can vote to determine the levels of public good provision and taxation. These outcomes provide an intuitive introduction to the topics about provision of local public goods and the Tiebout hypothesis. Also, instead of fixing the voting rule as in Konishi (1995) , in the experiment we allow each jurisdiction to collectively choose its own decision rule. The game illustrates that even though members of the jurisdictions can choose any voting mechanism, median voter's preferences determine the outcome most frequently.
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The outcome obtained from the median voter preferences coincides with the result from the simple majority rule, and thus provides some justification for the prevalence of the simple majority rule and a nice introduction to discussion on the median voter theorem.
The observed outcomes in this exercise can stimulate discussion on public goods, Pareto efficiency, voting rules, fiscal federalism, and related concepts in public choice and public finance, and provide intuition for ideas such as housing market and migration trend in urban economics. The experiment, therefore, can be used in introductory or intermediate microeconomics classes in addition to public finance, public choice, and urban economics.
Experimental Setup
In this section we describe the experimental design and provide the general procedures.
The Instruction Sheet in the Appendix provides the precise details for using this experiment in a class of about 15 students.
Design of the Experiment
The basic idea is to let the students sort themselves into different communities based on their preferences over (local) public goods. The sorting mechanism employed in this experiment is to allow the students vote with their feet and move to a community of their choice. Each community is allowed to provide only one public good. Playing cards are used to define preferences over possible types of public goods. The four different suits of cards correspond to four different types of public goods. Think of a community that chooses Diamonds as having a baseball museum. Those who select Clubs have a military museum and the Hearts community has a medical museum. The Spades community enjoys an agricultural museum.
The numbers on the cards are used to determine the preferences over public goods. If you have a hand with 3H, 10H and 4C, then you clearly prefer a Hearts community to a Club community. Your total utility from the public good provided in a Hearts community can be at most 13. Similarly if someone has a hand with 9H, 7D and 6C their preferred public good is the medical museum. After it has chosen one of the four possible public goods, the community also chooses the level of the public good to provide. Suppose the Hearts community chooses 9H as its preferred level. The person with the first hand of cards described above will get a benefit of 9 units, although the maximum possible level of benefits in a Hearts community for this person is 13. Since it is a public good, the second person mentioned above also gets 9 units of satisfaction in a Hearts community, which coincides with their maximum attainable level. Thus the benefit to any individual of being in a particular community is computed as follows,
of type i sum of cards of type i
where i is the type of public good chosen by the community. The cost of the public good (or tax burden) to each member of the community is determined as follows,
where k is a parameter chosen to rule out communities that are too small. Therefore, the payoff for every individual is defined as, Payoff = Benefit -Cost.
The instructor can discuss the different aspects of the local public good being provided in the experiment. The benefit level captures the non-rival part, which is identical for all members of a given community. Members from one community cannot enjoy public good provided by another community, hence the benefits of the good are local. Economies of scale in the provision of public good are modeled through the tax part where a larger community reduces the contribution of every member. The parameter k rules out the formation of communities of size smaller than k.
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Procedure
Playing cards, a few manila envelopes and copies of the Instruction Sheet in the appendix will suffice in terms of advance preparation for carrying out this experiment in a 50 minutes class period. Begin by marking the location of the predetermined communities in the classroom with the manila envelopes. Each envelope should display the name of the community. Choose community name you think will appeal to your students. Assign each student to an initial community. To generate interesting behavior in the experiment, the initial number of communities should be greater than the number of public goods. If you have 5 initial communities place them in the four corners of the room with the remaining community in the middle. Assign the students to a community based on where they are seated. Next, hand out copies of the Instruction Sheet to the class and a stack of cards (only the numbered cards) to each community. Read through the one page Instruction Sheet. After reading through the first two examples, work out the third example from the Instruction Sheet provided here on the board since it will not be on the student's sheet. This will ensure that all students understand how payoffs are computed. After reading through the complete Instruction Sheet ask the students to write down what cards they have on the provided Record Sheet. This will allow you to analyze their move to other communities later. Also, at this point ask each community to elect its own mayor. The mayor's job is to coordinate the community's decision-making process by chairing meetings. He or she votes on all issues and in the event of a tie, serves as tiebreaker. The mayor will report the community's decision to the instructor. At the end of the experiment the mayor will have to write a brief summary describing the community's decision-making process. Once each community has selected its mayor, let the mayor deal out 3-4 cards to each student. For larger classes it will be necessary to use more decks of cards. The instructor might also choose to recruit a couple of volunteers from the class to assist with the experiment in large classes. Now announce that communities are free to choose their type and level of public good in any way they wish. To avoid any undesired strategic behavior, you should wait until all mayors have reported their decisions to you before posting results on the board. The first period will generally last longer. You might wish to walk around the class and help with a few suggestions.
It is a good idea to limit the duration of the first round to 6-7 minutes; otherwise endless arguments between the citizens of a community could slow down the experiment. When the mayors of each community have reported the community's choice and level of public good as well as the tax rate for the community, post this information on the board. Then announce the beginning of Round 2. You can run the experiment for a number of rounds depending on the time constraint. Usually five rounds will be sufficient for students to sort themselves into their own preferred communities or at least generate enough interesting behavior to have a stimulating class discussion.
Discussion
This section is based on a classroom experiment conducted at Washington and Lee University in the Spring of 2002. This was an undergraduate Public Choice class with 15 students who were initially divided into 5 communities of 3 students each, with the communities named after popular locations from the world of media and entertainment. The experiment is designed to run for five rounds, but all the students settled into their desired communities after four rounds. The results for Round 1 to Round 4 are shown in Table 1 . Note: R = round, S = suit, L= level, P = population, T = taxes.
Leading your students to the Tiebout Hypothesis
In Tiebout's voting-with-the-feet model, individuals reveal their preferences for various public good bundles by silently voting with their feet. They enter and exit communities in an effort to maximize their preferences. At the end, individuals sort themselves into communities of like tastes. The moving and sorting process happened fairly quickly during the experiment.
Based on recorded information, the total net benefit, which is obtained by summing up the individual net benefits for all members of the communities increased steadily in each subsequent round. It went up from 14 in Round 1 to 51 in the second round, and then to 65 and finally to 77 in Round 4. This is the proper place to introduce the Tiebout hypothesis. One way to highlight the Tiebout sorting process and the consequent improvement in welfare is to ask students the following question: "Compared to your initial community, are you at least as happy after moving?" In our experiment, all but two students said they were happier than before, while two students were just as happy as initially.
The outcome reached in Round 4 was also Pareto optimal. Keeping tax rates and the level of public good provision for every community constant, we compare the marginal cost of moving to a different community with the marginal benefit the individual would get from their hand of cards. We find that no individual can better off by moving and hence the outcome is Pareto optimal. The instructor can do a similar exercise in their class. After reviewing the concept of Pareto optimality, the instructor can go through the computation of marginal cost and marginal benefit of moving to another community using an example in the experiment or ask the students to perform the calculations for themselves. In our exercise consider the case of Mark who in Round 4 was in the town of Hoth. Mark had 3 Clubs, 10 Hearts, 13 Spades and 0
Diamonds. He gets a net benefit of 4.3 from staying in Hoth. Moving to Metropolis would result in a net loss of 2.2 while moving to Moe's Tavern would lead to a larger loss of 10. Only a move to Springfield would give him a positive net benefit of 3 but not sufficient to compensate for the loss of a payoff of 4.3 enjoyed in the town of Hoth.
Leading your students to a Median Voter Example
When decisions are made on the type and size of museum to provide, the communities are allowed to choose any voting rule. During the experiment, however, the level of public good chosen by the majority of communities was the level of the median voter. In fact, for 17 out of the 19 decisions made in the experiment, the community members chose the median level of public good. In the case of an even number of members in the community, they chose one of the two middle numbers.
Based on this observation, the instructor can introduce the concepts of majority voting rule and median voter value, and discuss the decisiveness of the median voter and the equivalence of the two voting rules. An example from the experiment can be used to illustrate the material. For instance, consider Metropolis in Round 1, where the values of the clubs were 0, 15, and 18. The group in the experiment chose a level of 15. You would ask them why they chose 15 as their level. In Rounds 3 and 4, after the influx of Club-lovers from South Park, the Metropolis Club cards became 9, 13, 13, 15 and 18. They chose 13, which is the median level.
To stimulate discussion you might introduce an alternative. What would happen if a player
proposed 15? The students should recognize a majority would defeat 15. After a series of questions and examples such as above, your students should begin to recognize the median voter as decisive.
The Power and Inefficiency of the Median Voter Result
The median voter result is easy to obtain and provides improvement in total net benefit when used in the Tiebout model. Another discussion can be held in class on whether the median voter result is also the best outcome in the sense of giving the highest cumulative net benefit to all members in the community.
Given the structure of the community cumulative payoffs in this experiment---
, where i indexes the type of card chosen by the community, j indexes the individual member in the community, and N is the total number of members in the community ---the optimal outcome for the community is always between the levels most desired by the persons with the second and the third highest values for the chosen suit. The Samuelsonian Demand for Clubs (the vertical sum of individual demands) for the Metropolis Community in Round 4 illustrates this result. Because the total social cost of providing public good of level q is 2q, the marginal social cost is 2, independent of the level of public good provision, as shown by the dashed line in Figure 1 below. The marginal social value is given by the solid curve, decreasing in the level of public good provision. The optimal level for the community, therefore, is given by the intersection of marginal social cost and marginal social value---an interval between 13 and 15 in this case, or in general, the range between the second and the third lowest values in the community.
Consequently, the median voter outcome is also optimal for the community if there are three, four, or five members in it. The reason is that in such small communities at least one of the second and the third lowest values will coincide with the value of the median voter. Since there were no more than five members in a community at any point in time, the median voter outcome obtained in this particular experiment happens to be the best outcome for the community. It is worth emphasizing in class, however, that the median voter outcome does not always coincide with the community optimum. If there were 9 members in a community, for example, the highest net benefit for all members in this community would not be achieved at the level of the median voter, or the fifth highest value. An additional limitation of the median voter result is that it did not attain the maximum total benefit for the society, which consists of all the 15 members in all communities. The maximum overall social benefit in a sustainable equilibrium would have been 82. To achieve this optimal outcome would require a coalition of members to move to the Hearts community while eliminating the Spades community altogether and reducing the size of the Diamond community from 3 to 2. In the process, some individuals will become better off and some worse off, but the total attainable level of net benefit will rise to 82. In the outcome achieved in the experiment, 11 out of 15 members were placed in the communities prescribed in the socially optimal solution that maximizes individual, community, as well as social net benefit. The outcome obtained in the experiment attained 93.9% of that benefit. 
Further Reading
In this section we provide a brief bibliography for the Tiebout model and of related work in the median voter framework.
There is a wealth of literature surrounding the Tiebout hypothesis. One portion addresses whether the conditions specified in Tiebout (1956) yield a theoretically efficient outcome. Papers such as Richter (1978) and Wooders (1980) (1980) is an excellent source of review for the early theoretical work. For some recent work on the Tiebout hypothesis see Conley and Wooders (2001) and Nechyba (1997) . In Nechyba's (1997) model voters own private goods and are mobile and financing of public goods is both local as well as national. Majority rule voting determines the expenditure on public goods. The existence of general equilibrium is proved with minimal restrictive assumptions on preferences and technologies. Conley and Wooders (2001) consider a Tiebout economy with differential crowding and public projects in which agents are distinguished by their tastes and genetic endowments. They establish conditions under which the core is equivalent to the set of anonymous competitive outcomes. A dynamic version of the Tiebout model has been recently analyzed by Glomm and Lagunoff (1999) .
Empirical research generally favors the Tiebout hypothesis in broad terms. Oates (1969) is frequently cited in support of the Tiebout hypothesis, though many other, more recent, articles such as Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982) , Hoyt and Rosenthal (1997) and Fisher and Wassmer (1998) also affirm the central tenets of Tiebout.
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Of particular interest to students might be the fact that voter demands for education in Long Island and New York support the Tiebout prediction that sorting of communities should be more complete the greater the range of community choices (Munley, 1982; Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1981) . Specifically these papers find that voter demand for education decreased as the number of school jurisdictions increased.
Similarly, using data from local public schools in Michigan, Rubinfeld, Shapiro, and Roberts (1987) show a bias in demand estimates in the presence of a taste for the quantity and quality of the public goods in each community (Tiebout bias). Hoyt and Rosenthal's (1997) He reports strong support from empirical studies for two testable aspects of the Tiebout model: (1) the relationship between government expenditure-tax plans and migration patterns, and (2) these migrations lead to the formation of groups with almost same tastes for public goods. Note that our experiment also provides evidence for both of these features. When there are both public and private producers for a public good, their competition does not necessarily lead to efficient outcomes. In an interesting paper, Hoxby (1995) extends Tiebout hypothesis to form a theory of producers of a public good like education and compares the gain and losses from equitable policies with the efficiency 7 of the public good (cost minimization).
She shows that equalized consumption could leave the society, of producers and consumers, with a net negative gain.
The literature underpinning the median voter analysis begins with Hotelling (1929) before being refined by Downs (1957) and others. Hotelling (1929) provides a locational model adapted by Downs and others to construct the median voter model. Plott (1976) is an early reference that provides a long and interesting overview of the area. Empirical research, such as Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982) and Turnbull and Chang (1998) , tends to support the hypothesis that median voter's preferences determine government fiscal behavior, though some, such as Romer and Rosenthal (1979) , question whether the median voter is decisive. Adapting the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP), Turnbull and Chang (1998) find local governments behave as if they maximized the median voter's utility. Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982) affirm both Tiebout and Median Voter hypotheses. In their paper Romer and Rosenthal (1979) review the empirical work and show that actual expenditures do not correspond, in general, to median voter's choices. More recently, Perroni and Scharf (2001) argue that for individuals with same taste in each jurisdiction under majority voting for public goods, tax competition can improve the welfare.
